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I. INTRODUCTION
Dean Prosser, in his celebrated article, The Assault Upon the Citadel,
compared the assault on warranty law's privity requirement to an attack on a
stoutly defended fortress during the Middle Ages.1 Since that time, another
conflict has arisen among students of products liability, namely whether
product sellers should be subject to strict liability or whether certain aspects
of this field should instead be controlled by negligence principles. However,
unlike the assault some sixty years ago on the privity requirement, this present
conflict bears a greater resemblance to the protracted trench warfare of World
War I than it does to the siege of a medieval citadel.
In a nutshell, here is the problem: For reasons that will be described
in greater detail below, the law of products liability was cast solely in terms
* Associate Dean for Faculty Research and Stites & Harbison Professor of Law, University of
Kentucky. B.A. 1966, J.D. 1968, University of Florida; LL.M. 1973, Yale Law School. I would like to
thank the University of Kentucky College of Law for supporting this research with a Summer research
grant.
See William L. Prosser, The Assault Upon the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer), 69 YALE
L.J. 1099, 1103 (1960).
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of strict liability in tort when the courts abandoned warranty law in the 1960s.
The early pioneers, such as Prosser and Traynor, believed that defectiveness
was the touchstone of liability under their proposed strict liability regime.
Only later, did it become apparent that the existing defectiveness paradigm,
which worked well with manufacturing defects, was not suitable in cases
where a product's design or warnings were at issue.' Instead, courts and
commentators developed various tests of defectiveness for product designs
and warnings purportedly based on strict liability. In fact, these tests, which
typically involved some form of risk-utility balancing, were based more on
negligence than strict liability.
I conclude that the time has come to repudiate concepts of
defectiveness and strict liability in design and failure to warn cases, which
constitute the bulk of products liability litigation,3 and instead adopt an
approach that focuses more on manufacturer conduct. In other words, strict
liability and the concept of defectiveness hould be confined to manufacturing
defects. Furthermore, negligence principles should be applied when design
and failure to warn cases are involved and the concept of defectiveness can
be dispensed with as unnecessary since the risk-utility balancing analysis of
negligence can focus on the manufacturer's conduct instead.
Part II recounts the familiar story of how strict products liability
triumphed over negligence and warranty law in the early 1960s. It also
explores the role that policy rationales, such as risk distribution and accident
cost avoidance, played in the development of products liability law during
this period. Part III examines the use of defectiveness as a liability standard
and also documents the lingering role of negligence in § 402A and its
comments. It also describes the various tests for defectiveness that evolved
in the 1970s and 1980s in response to the increasing recognition that design
and warning cases needed to be evaluated differently than manufacturing
flaws. Part IV analyzes the new Products Liability Restatement and points
out its heavy reliance on negligence principles, particularly in § 2(b) and §
2(c). Finally, Part V proposes liability rules for design and warning cases that
eliminate defectiveness as a basis for liability and, instead, focus on the
conduct of the product manufacturer.
II. THE APPARENT TRIUMPH OF STRICT LIABILITY.
By the mid-1960s, a consensus had emerged among judges, lawyers,
and academics that strict liability in tort was the preferred basis for products
liability in the United States.4 But, how did this consensus come about? This
2 The term "warning" will be used to include instructions as well.
3 See David G. Owen, Defectiveness Restated: Exploding the "Strict" Products Liability Myth, 1996
U. ILL. L. REv. 743, 748 (1996).
4 But see Marcus L. Plant, Strict Liability for lnjuries Caused by Defects in Products-An Opposing
View, 24 TENN. L. REv. 938, 940 (1957).
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part of the article will examine the history of products liability from the
MacPherson case in 1916 to the promulgation of§ 402A in 1965 to determine
why negligence and warranty law were eventually rejected in favor of strict
liability in tort. Later, we shall examine why courts continued to adhere, at
least in theory, to strict liability in design and failure to warn cases even after
it became apparent that it made more sense to rely expressly on negligence
principles to resolve these cases.
A. The Journey from Negligence to Warranty to Strict Liability.
According to the popular narrative, the period from 1940 to 1965 was
marked by the gradual acceptance of strict liability as the basis for the modem
law of products liability. To be sure, strict liability had an ancient and
honorable pedigree, with deep roots in both criminal law and tort law. For
example, some of the laws of the Babylonian King, Hammurabi, imposed
strict liability on the owners of animals who injured others.5 Likewise, the
custom of "noxal surrender" practiced by Romans and other pre-Christian
Europeans allowed the owner of an object that accidentally caused harm to
another to avoid reprisals by turning over the object to the victim or his
family.6 The concept of deodand provides another example of the imposition
of liability without regard to the guilt or innocence of the defendant's
conduct.7 According to this principle, the owner of an object which caused
injury could avoid liability by surrendering it to the King who was supposed
to devote it to a charitable use.8 Finally, during the Middle Ages the writ of
trespass provided a remedy against personal injuries and invasions of property
injuries that resulted from direct contact, even when the contact was
unintentional.9 In effect, liability in such cases was strict.10
However, the first products liability cases were based on negligence
rather than strict liability.1 1 Chief among them was Winterbottom v. Wright,12
decided by an English court in 1842. The plaintiff in Winterbottom was the
' See M. Stuart Madden, The Cultural Evolution of Tort Law, 37 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 831, 849-50 (2005).
However, Hammurabi's laws also contain examples of liability for negligent conduct. Id. at 850.
6 See Jacob J. Finkelstein, The Goring Ox: Some Historical Perspective on Deodands, Forfeitures,
Wrongful Death and the Western Notion of Sovereignty, 46 TEMP. L.Q. 169, 181-82 (1973).
7 See Wex S. Malone, Ruminations on the Role of Fault in the History of the Common Law of Torts,
31 LA. L. REv. 1, (1970) (internal citations omitted).
' Finkelstein, supra note 6, at 182. Deodand was not abolished in England until 1846. Id. at 170
(internal citations omitted).
9 See Charles 0. Gregory, Trespass to Negligence to Absolute Liability, 37 VA. L. REv. 359, 361-62
(1951). Strictly speaking, the type of contact necessary to impose liability was considered to be a wrong
in itself d. at 363.
"0 See Peter Handford, Intentional Negligence: A Contradiction in Terms?, 32 SYDNEY L. REv. 29, 39
(2010).
" Prior to the Industrial Revolution, most commercially produced products were produced by
individual craftsmen. The guilds to which these craftsmen belonged imposed liability on their members if
their products failed to meet the guild's quality standards. See David G. Owen, The Evolution of Products
Liability Law, 26 REv. LITIG. 955, 957 (2007).
12 See Generally Winterbottom v. Wright, 152 Eng. Rep. 402 (Exch. 1842).
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driver of a Royal Mail stagecoach who was injured when the coach broke
down and caused him to be thrown from his seat.3 The plaintiff sued the
contractor who had supplied the coach, alleging that that he had failed to
properly maintain it.14 However, the court dismissed the claim because there
was no privity of contract between the parties.15 For more than seventy years
thereafter, Winterbottom was cited for the proposition that lack of privity
would bar negligence and breach of contract claims against remote product
manufacturers.
16
Then, in 1916, Justice Cardozo in MacPherson v. Buick Motor
Company17 expressly rejected Winterbottom's privity requirement, at least
where a consumer was harmed by a product that was "imminently dangerous"
when defective.1 8  In MacPherson, the plaintiff was injured when one of
wheels of his Buick Runabout collapsed, causing the car to swerve into a
ditch.19 Eventually, almost all American courts came to agree with Justice
Cardozo that privily of contract was an inappropriate requirement in an era
where product manufacturers rarely entered into contracts with their retail
customers.2 ° Thus, MacPherson opened the way to a products liability regime
based on negligence principles.
However, once the privity barrier was overcome, it quickly became
apparent that negligence, at least in its traditional form, was inadequate from
the perspective of injured consumers. One obvious difficulty was proving
that the manufacturer failed to exercise reasonable care in designing or
fabricating the product in question.21 Expert testimony was often required to
prove lack of due care, although some courts mitigated the plaintiff's burden
of proof on this issue by expanding the scope of res ipsa loquitur.22 In
addition, in order to prevail, the injured consumer would have to prove that
13 id.
14 Id. at 403. Strictly speaking, the lawsuit was an action on the case, but the underlying claim was
based on negligence. See Kyle Graham, Strict Products Liability at 50: Four Histories, 98 MARQ. L. REv.
555, 562 (2014).
" The privity doctrine provided that a manufacturer's duty only extended to its immediate purchaser.
See Sheila L. Birnbaum, Unmasking the Test for Design Defect: From Negligence [to Warranty] to Strict
Liability to Negligence, 33 VAND. L. REv. 593, 593 (1980).
16 See Cornelius W. Gillam, Products Liability in a Nutshell, 37 OR. L. REv. 119, 133 (1958). During
this period, American courts employed a number of questionable devices to circumvent the privity defense.
Id. at 152-55.
17 MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 111 N.E. 1050 (N.Y. 1916).
8 Id. at 397-98. Cardozo relied for this proposition on Thomas v. Winchester, 217 N.Y. 382 (1852),
in which a druggist was held liable for selling a drug labeled as extract of dandelion when in fact it
contained extract of belladonna, a deadly poison. The court in Thomas declared that, since the poison was
imminently dangerous, the druggist owed a duty to the public in general and not just to one with whom he
was in privity. Id.
'9 Id. at 384.
20 See Dix W. Noel, Manufacturers of Products-The Drift Toward Strict Liability, 24 TENN. L. REv.
963, 965 (1957). The rule in MacPherson was also adopted by the Restatement of Torts. See Restatement
(First) of Torts § 395 (1934).
21 Birnbaum, supra note 15, at 595; Gillam, supra note 16, at 144-45.
22 Noel, supra note 20, at 978-79; George L. Priest, Strict Products Liability: The OriginalIntent, 10
CARDozo L. REv. 2301, 2307 (1989).
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the defendant's negligence caused his or her injuries. Finally, there were a
variety of affirmative defenses, such as contributory negligence and
assumption of risk, which a manufacturer could invoke to defeat a consumer's
damage claim.
These concerns led legal scholars to search for a liability theory for
products liability that did not require a finding of fault. Strict liability was an
obvious possibility. At that time, a number of strict liability rules were
recognized in the United States. One form of strict liability was the rule that
imposed strict liability for injuries caused by trespassing livestock or wild
animals that escaped from captivity. 3 In addition, in a number of states,
persons who engaged in "ultrahazardous" activities on their land were subject
to strict liability.24 However, it was clear that neither of these liability rules
could be directly applied to defective products.
Another form of liability, warranty law, seemed to offer a more
promising alternative to negligence. An express warranty could arise when
the seller made an express promise or statement of fact to the buyer about the
quality or safety of the product being sold. In addition, implied warranties
could arise by operation of law, regardless of the intent of the parties.6 The
most important implied warranty was that of merchantability or quality which
required that goods be reasonably fit (and safe) for their ordinary purposes.2 7
The seller could be held liable if the goods sold were not merchantable
regardless of whether or not the seller exercised reasonable care.
However, there were two aspects of warranty law that greatly reduced
its value as a strict liability to consumers. First, warranties were generally
limited to parties who were in privity with each other. Second, warranties
could be disclaimed and remedies could be limited by the seller. During the
period between 1940 and 1965, both commentators and courts attacked these
features in the hopes of transforming warranty law into a more pro-consumer
liability regime.2' As in the case of negligence, the critics initially
concentrated their fire on the privity requirement. Beginning with Mazetti v.
Armour & Co., a number of courts also did away with the privity requirement
in implied warranty cases involving food and drink, citing, inter alia, the
23 See Charles E. Cantu, Distinguishing the Concept of Strict Liability in Tort from Strict Products
Liability: Medusa Unveiled, 33 MEM. L. REv. 823, 829-37 (2003).
24 Marcus L. Plant, Strict Liability for Injuries Caused by Defects in Products-An Opposing View,
24 TENN. L. REv. 938, 940 (1957).
25 See James A. Spruill, Jr., Privity of Contract as a Requisite for Recovery on Warranty, 19 N.C.L.
REV. 551, 559 (1941).
2 See Cornelius W. Gillam, Products Liability in a Nutshell, 37 OR. L. REv. 119, 126 (1948).
27 See William L. Prosser, The Implied Warranty of Merchantable Quality, 27 MINN. L. REv. 117, 121
(1943).
2 See, e.g., Greenman v. Yuba Power Prod. Inc,, 377 P.2d 897 (Cal. 1963); Henningsen v. Bloomfield
Motors, Inc., 161 A.2d 69 (N.J. 1960); Prosser, supra note 1, at 1099.
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public's interest in safe products for human consumption.29 In addition, in
the 1930s, a few courts began to hold that privity of contract would not be
required to recover for breach of an express warranty for the sensible reason
that such warranties were really directed at the ultimate purchaser, not the
person with whom the manufacturer was in privity.3" However, as Dean
Prosser points out, it was not until the 1950s that the tide began to turn more
generally against the privity of contract requirement in implied warranty
cases.3 At first, the courts proceeded cautiously, doing away with the privity
requirement for products intended for intimate bodily use such as hair dye,
3 2
soap,33 and permanent wave solution.34 Later, the privity requirement was
rejected in cases involving ordinary products such as cinder blocks3 5 and
electric cable.36
Eventually, the privity requirement suffered a fatal blow in 1960
when the New Jersey Supreme Court did away with it in a case where a retail
consumer was injured when her newly purchased automobile veered off the
road and crashed into a brick wall.37 The court in Henningsen v. Bloomfield
Motors declared that consumers should be able to hold manufacturers
responsible when their products caused harm, regardless of the absence of
privity.38 Furthermore, the Henningsen court also ruled that manufacturers
could not avoid liability for product-related injuries by the use of disclaimers
or by otherwise attempting to limit a consumer's remedies.39 According to
Professor Priest, "Henningsen marked the effective end of the relevance of
contract law in defective product actions involving personal injury. Its
holding allows recovery based on an implied warranty of merchantability, but
it repudiates every other principle of contract law potentially applicable to
product defect actions."4
While purporting to liberate warranty law from the twin restrictions
of privity and disclaimers, the Henningsen decision exposed the inadequacies
29 75 Wash. 622, 135 P. 633, 636 (1913). See, e.g., Klein v. Duchess Sandwich Co., 93 P.2d 799, 804
(Cal. 1939); Coca-Cola Bottling Works v. Lyons, 111 So. 305, 307 (Miss. 1927); Jacob E. Decker & Sons
v. Capps, 144 S.W.2d 404 (Tex. Civ. App. 1940).
3o See Baxter v. Ford Motor Co., 12 P,2d 409 (Wash. 1932); Larson v. Fid. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 35
P.2d 108 (Wash. 1934).
31 Prosser, supra note 1, at 1111-14.
32 See Graham v. Bottenfield's, Inc., 269 P.2d 413 (Kan. 1954).
13 See Kruper v. Proctor & Gamble Co., 113 N.E.2d 605 (Ohio Ct. App. 1953), rev'd on other grounds,
117 N.E.2d 7 (Ohio 1954).
34 See Markovich v. McKesson & Robbins, 149 N.E.2d 181 (Ohio Ct. App. 1958).
35 See Spence v. Three Rivers Builders & Masonry Supply, Inc., Inc., 90 N.W.2d 873 (Mich. 1958).
3 See Continental Copper & Steel Indus. V. E.C. "Red" Cornelius, Inc., 104 So. 2d 40 (Fla. D.C.A..
1958).
" See Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 161 A.2d 69, 95 (N.J. 1960).
31 Id. at 99-100.
31 Id. at 95, 97; see also David G. Owen, The Evolution of Products Liability Law, 26 Rev. Litig. 955,
971 (2007).
4o See George L. Priest, The Invention of Enterprise Liability: A Critical History of the Intellectual
Foundations of Modern Tort Law, 14 J. Legal Stud. 461, 507 (1985); see also David G. Owen, The Fault
Pit, 26 Ga_ L. Rev. 703, 713 (1992).
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of warranty law as a source of consumer protection and opened the door for a
tort-based system of strict liability instead.41 Almost twenty years earlier, in
Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co. of Fresno,4 2 Justice Roger Traynor had
urged the California court to adopt strict liability in tort as a basis for imposing
liability on the sellers of defective products. The Escola case involved a
waitress who was injured when a soft drink bottled broke in her hand.43
Although the court upheld a lower court judgment for the plaintiff on the basis
of res ipsa loquitur, Traynor argued that warranty law did not offer sufficient
protection to ordinary consumers who were injured by defective products.44
Instead, Traynor declared, "it should now be recognized that a manufacturer
incurs absolute liability when an article that he has placed on the market,
knowing that it is to be used without inspection, proves to have a defect that
causes injury to human beings.' '45 Despite Traynor's forceful advocacy of
strict liability in tort, his concurring opinion in Escola went largely unnoticed
at the time. 46
However, three years after the Henningsen decision, the California
Supreme Court in Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc.,47 expressly
rejected implied warranty as a basis for products liability in favor of Traynor's
theory of strict liability in tort. The plaintiff in Greenman was struck in the
head by a block of wood when the Shopsmith workbench he was using
malfunctioned.48 The plaintiff alleged negligence and breach of warranty
against the manufacturer. The manufacturer defended against the warranty
claim by contending that the plaintiff failed to provide it with reasonable
notice of his claim, as required by a provision of the Uniform Sales Act.49
However, Chief Justice Traynor, speaking for a unanimous court, not
only rejected this argument, but went on to declare that "[a] manufacturer is
strictly liable in tort when an article he places on the market, knowing that it
is to be used without inspection for defects, proves to have a defect that causes
injury to a human being."5 The Greenman decision "swept the country in a
firestorm fashion" and most legal commentators applauded what they thought
was a victory for strict liability.51
At the same time that the Greenman case was working its way
" See Priest at 507-08.
42 Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 150 P.2d 436, 440 (Cal. 1944).
43 Id.
4Id.
45 Id. at 440.
4 See George L. Priest, The Invention of Enterprise Liability: A Critical History of the Intellectual
Foundations of Modern Tort Law, 14 J. LEGAL STUD. 461,498-99 (1985).
47 377 P.2d 897, 901 (Cal. 1963).
Id. at 898.
49 Id. at 899.
'0 Id. at 900.
" See Charles E. Cantu, Distinguishing the Concept of Strict Liability in Tort from Strict Products
Liability: Medusa Unveiled, 33 U. MEM. L. REV. 823, 867 (2003).
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through the California courts, a committee of American Law Institute chaired
by Dean Prosser was drafting a provision to the Restatement of Torts for the
purpose of addressing the products liability issue.52 The result was § 402A,
which embraced Greenman's adoption of strict liability in tort.53 According
to this provision, one who sold a product "in a defective condition
unreasonably dangerous to the user or consumer" was liable for any resulting
physical harm even though the seller "exercised all possible care in the
preparation and sale of his product."54 Like the Greenman decision, § 402A
achieved widespread acceptance throughout the country.
In the years before § 402A made it official, most legal scholars
endorsed strict liability on both practical and theoretical grounds. William
Prosser and Roger Traynor were among those who set the stage for strict
liability by focusing on the practical limitations of warranty law,55 while
Fleming James developed a theoretical argument in support of strict liability
based on the concept of risk distribution.56
In the 1940s and 1950s, Prosser and Traynor focused their attention on those
aspects of warranty law that they felt disqualified it as a means of dealing with
the problem of defective products. Although warranty law was nominally a
no-fault liability regime, in fact, it presented many barriers to recovery by
injured consumers.57 In particular, to succeed under implied warranty, the
plaintiff had to show that there was privity of contract between him and the
manufacturer of the defective product. In addition, the consumer had to give
the manufacturer timely notice that a breach of warranty hadoccurred.58
Finally, manufacturers and other sellers could limit their liability
contractually by means of disclaimers and limitation of remedies. Both
Prosser and Traynor contended that these doctrines foreclosed the use of
warranty law as a basis for products liability.59
The primary focus of their criticism was the privity requirement.
According to this concept, those who entered into a contract with one another
were in privity, while those who had not contracted directly with one another
52 See Kyle Graham, Strict Products Liability at 50: Four Histories, 98 MARQ. L. REV. 555, 577-78
(2014).
" See David G. Owen, The Evolution of Products Liability Law, 26 REv. LrrG. 955, 974-75 (2007).
54 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (Am. Law Inst. 1965).
" As early as 1941, Prosser in the first edition of his treatise on the law of torts, set forth the arguments
for strict liability. See William L. Prosser, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS, 688-93 (1941). Traynor
did the same a few years later in his concurring opinion in Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co. of Fresno, 150
P.2d 436,440-44 (Cal. 1944). Other proponents of strict liability included Page Keeton, Wex Malone and
Dix Noel. See George L. Priest, Comment, Strict Product Liability: The Original Intent, 10 CARDOzO L.
REV. 2301, 2307 (1989).
56 See James R. Hackney, Jr., The Intellectual Origins of American Strict Liability: A Case Study in
American Pragmatic Instrumentalism, 39 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 443, 490-95 (1995)
" See Sheila L. Bimbaum, Unmasking the Test for Design Defect: From Negligence [to Warranty] to
Strict Liability to Negligence, 33 VAND. L. REV. 593, 596 (1980).
58 See Prosser, supra note 1, at 1130.
59 See Prosser, supra note 1, at 1133-34; Greenman, 377 P.2d at 900.
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were not.6°  As one commentator pointed out, the privity requirement
developed when products buyers and sellers dealt with each other face-to-face
and where most buyers were capable of inspecting these products to
determine their quality.61 However, as the nature of marketing and production
changed, the privity requirement ceased to serve any purpose other than to
insulate product sellers from liability. This led Prosser and others to argue that
the privity requirement should be abandoned and that manufacturers'
warranties, express and implied, should run to the ultimate purchasers of their
products.
62
The notice requirement was another aspect of warranty law that came
under attack during this period. This provision of the Uniform Sales Act
required a buyer who accepted delivery of goods to notify the seller within a
reasonable time that the goods were defective.63 Prosser acknowledged that
the notice requirement served a useful purpose where disputes arose between
the immediate parties to a contract for the sale of goods. 6  However, quoting
from an article by Fleming James,65 he warned that when this requirement
was applied to remote parties in personal injury cases, it became "a booby-
trap for the unwary."'  In addition, Prosser cautioned that "[t]he injured
consumer is seldom 'steeped in the business practice which justifies the rule'
and at least until he has had legal advice it will not occur to him to give notice
to one with whom he has had no dealings.67 Chief Justice Traynor made a
similar observation in Greenman, also describing the notice requirement as a
"booby-trap for the unwary."
68
In addition, critics of warranty law also criticized the use of
disclaimers and limitations of remedies in sales contracts. Disclaimers
prevented an implied warranty from arising in the first place,69 while
limitations restricted the remedies available to the injured party if a breach of
warranty occurred.7" Advocates of strict liability argued that disclaimers and
limitations of remedies stripped consumers of warranty protection, leaving
' See Debra L Goetz et al., Special Project, Article Two Warranties in Commercial Transactions: An
Update, 72 CORNELL L. REv. 1159, 1310 (1987).
61 See See Lester W. Freezer, Manufacturer's Liabilityfor Injuries Caused by His Products: Defective
Automobiles, 37 MICH. L. REV. 1, 1 (1938).
62 Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 161 A.2d 69, 80 (N.J. 1960); see also 2 Harper & James,
Law of Torts 1571-72 (1956); see also Prosser, Law of Torts 506-11 (2d ed. 1955).
63 See Uniform Sales Act § 49 (1906). A similar provision can be found in the Uniform Commercial
Code. See also Uniform Commercial Code § 2-607(3)(a).
6' Prosser, supra note 1, at 1130.
65 Fleming James, Jr., Products Liability, 34 TEx. L. REv. 44 (1955).
6 Prosser, supra note 1, at 1130.
67 Id.
'8 Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc., 377 P.2d 897, 900 (1963).
69 William L. Prosser, The Implied Warranty of Merchantable Quality, 27 Minn. L. Rev. 117, 157
(1943).
70 Debra L Goetz et al., Special Project, Article Two Warranties in Commercial Transactions: An
Update, 72 CORNELL L. REv. 1159, 1289 (1987).
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them without legal recourse if they were injured.7 Again, Prosser conceded
that disclaimers and limitations on remedies were appropriate in contracts
between commercial buyers and sellers.72 However, he declared, "[i]t is
another thing entirely to say that the consumer who buys at retail is bound by
a disclaimer which he has never seen, and to which he would certainly not
have agreed if he had known of it, but which defeats a duty imposed by the
policy of law for his protection."73  The Henningsen court echoed this
sentiment, declaring that inequality of bargaining power forced buyers to
accept oppressive conditions:
They must often accept what they can get though
accompanied by broad disclaimers. The terms of these
disclaimers deprive them of all substantial protection with
regard to the quality of the goods. In effect, this is by force
of contract between very unequal parties. It throws the risk
of defective articles on the most dependent party. He has the
least individual power to avoid the presence of defects. He
also has the least individual ability to bear their disastrous
consequences.74
Another argument against warranty was the problem of "circularity."
Under warranty law, the injured consumer would sue the retailer, who would
then sue the supplier for indemnity who would sue the next person up the
supply chain until it reached the manufacturer. As Prosser pointed out, "[t]his
is an expensive, time-consuming, and wasteful process and it may be
interrupted by insolvency, lack of jurisdiction, disclaimers, or the statute of
limitations anywhere along the line. 75 In his view, it would be more efficient
to allow an injured consumer to sue the manufacturer of a defective product
directly.76
Finally, the proponents of strict liability constructed a narrative about
the relationship between manufacturers and consumers that reinforced their
contention that warranty law was inadequate to protect consumers against
defective products. Their first claim was that true "freedom of contract" was
lacking in most cases because the prevalence of adhesion contracts made it
impossible for consumers to bargain for greater protection from
manufacturers. This argument was influenced by the work of Friedrich
Kessler.77 Kessler argued that in the modem age of mass production, freedom
" Prosser, supra note 1, at 1133.
7 Id.
3 id.
"4 Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 161 A.2d 69, 87 (N.J. 1960) (quoting Lawrence Void, Law
of Sales 447 (2d ed. 1959)).
"' Prosser, supra note 1, at 1124.
76 Id.
7 Priest, supra note 40, at 484.
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of contract was an illusion.78 Instead, standardized contracts enabled parties
with greater bargaining power to impose their will on weaker parties.79
Prosser, Traynor, and others embraced Kessler's theory of unequal bargaining
power. For example, in Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc,81 Justice
Francis described the adhesion contract in the case as "a sad commentary
upon the automobile manufacturers' marketing practices,' 81 the court
declared that:
[I]n present-day commercial life the standardized
mass contract has appeared. It is used primarily by
enterprises with strong bargaining power and position. "The
weaker party, in need of the goods or services, is frequently
not in a position to shop around for better terms, either
because the author of the standard contract has a monopoly
(natural or artificial) or because all competitors use the same
clauses.8 2
Another concern was information asymmetry between manufacturers
and retail consumers.83 According to this narrative, in the good old days,
products were simple and buyers were familiar enough with them to
accurately evaluate their safety and quality."4 However, as products became
more complex, the average consumer had little ability to inspect for defects
or to otherwise protect himself against injury.85 According to Traynor, "[tlhe
consumer no longer has means or skill enough to investigate for himself the
soundness of a product, even when it is not contained in a sealed package."
'
A final component of the manufacturer-consumer relationship
centered on the production and marketing practices of large manufacturers.
By the dawn of the twentieth century, it became apparent that the marketing
structure of modem business enterprises largely excluded any direct contact
between producers of products and retail consumers.87 Traynor alluded to this
development in Escola, declaring that, "[a]s handicrafts have been replaced
by mass production with its great markets and transportation facilities, the
close relationship between the producer and consumer of a product has been
I See Friedrich Kessler, Contracts of Adhesion-Some Thoughts about Freedom of Contract, 43
COLUM. L. REv. 629, 632 (1943).
79 Id.
0 161 A.2d 69, 86 (1960).
" Id. at 78.
'2 Id. at 86.
3 See Mary J. Davis, Individual and Institutional Responsibility: A Vision Comparative Fault in
Products Liability, 39 Viii. L. Rev. 281, 347 (1994).
4 See Lester W. Freezer, Manufacturers' Liability for Injuries Caused by his Products, 37 Mich. L.
Rev. 1, 1 (1938).
81 See K. N. Llewellyn, On Warranty of Quality and Society: 11, 37 Colum. L. Rev. 341,404 (1937).
8 Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 150 P.2d 436, 443 (Cal. 1944).
7 See Kyle Graham, Strict Products Liability at 50: Four Histories, 98 Marq. L. Rev. 555, 565 (2014).
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altered.-'
At the same time, manufacturers often engaged in marketing and
promotional activities that were designed to provide consumers with a false
sense of security about the safety and quality of their wares. In the words of
the Henningsen court,
[U]nder modem conditions the ordinary layman, on
responding to the importuning of colorful advertising, has
neither the opportunity nor the capacity to inspect or to
determine the fitness of an automobile for use; he must rely
on the manufacturer who has control of its construction, and
to some degree on the dealer who, to the limited extent called
for by the manufacturer's instructions, inspects and services
it before delivery. In such a marketing milieu his remedies
and those of persons who properly claim through him should
not depend "upon the intricacies of the law of sales."89
All of this supported the proposition that modem consumers needed
greater legal protection against the harm caused by defective products. This
left strict liability in tort as the sole remaining option.
While Prosser, Traynor, and their supporters were attacking warranty
law on practical and doctrinal grounds, Fleming James was providing
theoretical support for strict liability in tort. James justified a shift to strict
liability primarily in terms of risk distribution goals.9" The theoretical
foundation of James's approach to risk distribution seems to have been based
on enterprise liability. Simply stated, enterprise liability posits that losses
created or caused by an enterprise or activity should be borne by those that
benefit from that enterprise or activity.91  This was because commercial
enterprises were better able to spread these costs than individual victims and
because these enterprises were more likely to respond to the safety incentives
created by the imposition of liability upon them.92 Workers compensation
statutes represent an early application of this principle.93 Under these laws,
injured workers received compensation on a no-fault basis because these
losses constituted a cost of doing business because employers could pass them
along to the consumers who ultimately benefitted from the enterprise in
' Escola, 150 P.2d at 443.
89 See Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 161 A.2d 69, 83 (1960).
9 See Gary T. Schwartz, Article, The Beginning and Possible End of the Rise of Modern American
Tort Law, 26 Ga L. Rev. 601, 635 (1992).
" See Howard C. Klemme, The Enterprise Liability Theory of Torts, 47 U. Colo. L. Rev. 153, 158
(1976).
92 See Stephen D. Sugarman, A Century of Change in Personal Injury Law, 88 Cal. L. Rev. 2403, 2406
(2000).
" See Charles E. Cantu, Distinguishing the Concept of Strict Liability in Tort from Strict Products
Liability: Medusa Unveiled, 33 U. MEM. L. REV. 823, 862-63 (2003).
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question.94
Fleming James was more concerned with applying his risk
distribution theories to tort law more generally, but in the 1950s, he began to
turn his attention to products liability.95 In his treatise on the law of torts,
James also applied his theory of risk distribution to the problem of defective
products.
96
According to the theory of enterprise liability, the production and sale
of consumer products exposes purchasers and others to the risk of injury from
dangerous and defective products. Because manufacturers and others in the
distributive chain profit from the distribution of these products, it is
appropriate to require them to compensate those consumers who are injured
as a result of their exposure to harmful products. Not only do these
commercial enterprises have the resources to provide compensation, but the
imposition of strict liability will provide an incentive for them to improve the
safety of their products. Finally, liability could also be imposed on non-
manufacturers, such as distributors and retailers, because they facilitated the
distribution of defective products into the stream of commerce and profited
from such activities.
97
Although Prosser was skeptical of the "deterrence" rationale,98 he
was somewhat more receptive to the risk distribution argument.9  Traynor,
on the other hand, relied heavily on both of these concepts in his Escola
opinion, declaring that "public policy demands that responsibility be fixed
wherever it will most effectively reduce the hazards to life and health inherent
in defective products that reach the market.'l °°  Addressing the risk
distribution issue, Traynor pointed out that "[t]he cost of an injury and the
loss of time or health may be an overwhelming misfortune to the person
injured, and a needless one, for the risk of injury can be insured by the
manufacturer and distributed among the public as a cost of doing business."
' 01
The efforts of Prosser, Traynor, James, and others to promote strict
liability in tort eventually bore fruit in the early 1960s when negligence and
warranty law seemed to be completely banished from the products liability
scene. Instead, the new Restatement of Torts endorsed strict liability as the
9 See George L. Priest, The Invention of Enterprise Liability: A Critical History of the Intellectual
Foundations of Modern Tort Law, 14 J. LEGAL STUD. 461,466 (1985).
15 See Fleming James, Jr., Products Liability Pt. 2, 34 TEx. L. REV. 192,227-28 (1955).
9' See Fowler Harper & Fleming James, Jr., The Law of Torts (1956).
7 See Vandermark v. Ford Motor Co., 391 P.2d 168, 171-72 (Cal. 1964).
9' See Prosser, supra note 1, at 1133-34.
99 Id. at 1120.
'0 Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 24 Cal. 2d 453, 440 (1944) (Traynor, J., concurring).
lI' Id. at 441.
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most appropriate basis for products liability law.102
iM. NEGLIGENCE AND PRODUCTS LIABILITY.
While it was not apparent at the time, elements of negligence still
lurked in the shadows of 402A and continues to do so under the new Products
Liability Restatement regime.
A. The Restatement of Torts Section 402A.
Although comment m to § 402A expressly stated that "[t]he basis of
liability is purely one of tort,""1 3 the drafters of§ 402A did not create a wholly
strict liability system, but instead they put together a combination of warranty,
negligence, and strict liability. Even though § 402A expressly rejected the
privity requirement of warranty law"° and declared that it was not governed
by the provisions of the Uniform Sales Act or the Uniform Commercial
Code, aspects of warranty law played a prominent role in the black letter
text of § 402A and in the comments to it. First, strict liability was restricted
to the sale of a product"° by sellers who were "engaged in the business of
selling such a product."'0 7 This was similar to the sort of liability imposed on
commercial sellers under the implied warranty of merchantability. Second,
the Restatement limited liability to products that were sold "in a defective
condition unreasonably dangerous to the consumer or to his property."
10 8
This defect requirement was remarkably similar to the warranty law
requirement that a product be "merchantable." Furthermore, the use of the
consumer expectation test in comments g and i to define "defective condition"
and "unreasonably dangerous" reflected the warranty law principle that
consumers should get the goods that they bargained for.'" 9
Section 402A also required that a product be "unreasonably
dangerous" to the user or his property."0 This concept was addressed in
comment i. Although the phrase "unreasonably dangerous" sounds like
negligence, the drafters of § 402A inserted this language to confirm that a
product was not defective simply because it was inherently dangerous.1 '
Thus, sellers of such products as butter, drugs, whiskey or cigarettes were
102 § 402A(2)(a) expressly declared that a seller would be liable to an injured consumer even though
he "exercised all possible care in the preparation and sale of his product.....; See also David G. Owen, The
Evolution of Products Liability Law, 26 REv. LITIG. 955, 975 n. 100 (2007).
103 See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A, cmt. m (1979).
4 Id., § 402A(2)(b).
105 Id., § 402A, cmt. m.
1- Id., § 402A(1).
101 Id., § 402A(l)(a).
o Id., § 402A(1).
9 See Sheila L. Binbaum, Unmasking the Testfor Design Defect: From Negligence [to Warranty] to
Strict Liability to Negligence, 33 VAND. L. REv. 593, 614 (1980).
"o § 402A(1).
.. Mary J. Davis, Design Defect Liability: In Search of a Standard of Responsibility, 39 WAYNE L.
REV. 1217,1234 (1993).
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subject to liability only if they were more dangerous than a consumer would
expect them to be.'1 2  Thus, "good whiskey" would not be considered
unreasonably dangerous because it might cause drunkenness or alcoholism,
but "bad whiskey" that contained excessive levels of fusel oil would be.
1 3
Likewise, "good butter" would not be unreasonably dangerous because it
might cause heart attacks, but "bad butter," contaminated with poisonous fish
oil, would be."' This limitation on liability is not unlike the warranty concept
of merchantability that requires that products "pass without objection in the
trade."'15
In addition to aspects of warranty, negligence principles were also
amply represented in § 402A. For example, the drafters of § 402A excluded
certain products from the scope of strict liability, thereby leaving them to be
dealt with under negligence law.116  Thus, comment k provided that
"unavoidably unsafe" products would not be considered to be either defective
or unreasonably dangerous even though they caused injury to consumers.'17
Comment k did not define what it meant by "unavoidably unsafe;" rather, it
gave a number of examples. The first group included products like the rabies
vaccine that had high social utility but might cause harmful side effects."8
The second group of products included "drugs, vaccines, and the like" that
were sufficiently dangerous to require a prescription."9 The final category
consisted of "new or experimental drugs" that were potentially dangerous
because "lack of time and opportunity for sufficient medical experience"
made it impossible for the seller to guarantee the drug's safety.'21 In addition,
to be considered unavoidably unsafe, the product's apparent utility had to
outweigh its apparent risks and the seller was required to warn about known
risks.
121
Furthermore, a number of comments indicated that, in some cases,
the plaintiffs conduct relieves a defendant of liability. For example,
comment n stated that contributory negligence was not a defense when it
"2 Charles E. Cantu, Reflections on Section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts: A Mirror
Crack'd, 25 GONZ. L. REV. 205, 229 (1989).
113 See § 402A, cmt. i.
114 id.
115 U.C.C. § 2-314(2)(a) (2002).
"' See David A. Fischer, Products Liability-The Meaning of Defect, 39 Mo. L. REV. 339, 345-46
(1974); Marcia A. Mobilia, Allergic Reactions to Prescription Drugs: A Proposal for Compensation, 48
ALB. L. REV. 343, 345 (1984).
17 See Richard C. Ausness, Unavoidably Unsafe Products andStrict Products Liability: What Liability
Rule Should be Applied to the Sellers of Pharmaceutical Products?, 78 KY. L.J.705, 713 (1989-90). It is
interesting to note that the California Supreme Court concluded that "comment k, by focusing on the
blameworthiness of the manufacturer, sets forth a test which sounds in negligence." See Brown v. Superior
Court, 751 P.2d 470, 476 n. 4 (Cal. 1988).
118 See § 402A, cmt. k.
119 Id.
120 id.
121 Id. Since all of the examples provided in comment k involved prescription drugs and vaccines, most
courts limited its scope to pharmaceutical products; See DAVID G. OWEN & MARY J. DAVIS, OWEN &
DAVIS ON PROD. LIAB. § 19:5 at 868 (4th ed. 2014).
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merely consisted of failure to discover a defect in the product or to guard
against the possibility of a defect.122 However, comment n also declared that
a plaintiff would be barred from recovery if he became aware of the danger
and voluntarily and unreasonably made use of the product anyway.1
23
Other comments provided that product sellers would not be liable for
injuries that resulted from misuse such as "abnormal handling" or "abnormal
consumption.,124 In addition, commentj stated that sellers could assume that
consumers would follow instructions and warnings, presumably leaving them
without protection if they failed to do so.2s Although it is possible to
maintain, it is possible to have a doctrine that imposes strict liability on a
defendant, while barring recovery for plaintiffs based on their negligent
behavior,126 it is difficult to characterize such an arrangement as one of pure
strict liability. Rather, it is, at best, a mixture of strict liability and negligence.
B. Design Defects
The potential tension between negligence and strict liability in
products liability law soon came out into the open.127 The controversy settled
around the test for defectiveness in design and failure to warn cases. § 402A
did not distinguish among the various types of defects. Instead, it simply
stated that in order for there to be liability, the product in question be in a
"defective condition." This term was examined in comments g and h.
128
Comment g defined defective condition as one "not contemplated by the
ultimate consumer, which will be unreasonably dangerous to him."
129
Comment h declared that a product is not in defective condition "when it is
safe for normal handling and consumption.""13
This comment went on to provide that a defective condition "may
arise not only from harmful ingredients, not characteristic of the product itself
. . . but also from foreign objects contained in the product, from decay or
deterioration before sale, or from the way in which the product is prepared or
packed."'31  This latter provision seemed to be primarily directed at
contaminated food or drink.
However, courts soon began to realize that there was a significant
122 See § 402A, cmt. n (1965). This was consistent with the rule that ordinary contributory negligence
will not bar suits based on other forms of strict liability. See Mary J. Davis, Individual and institutional
Responsibility: A Vision for Comparative Fault in Products Liability, 39 VILL. L. REv. 281, 293 (1994).
123 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF THE LAW TORTS § 402A, cmt. n.
124 Id., cmt. H.
l11Id, cmL j.
126 See William C. Powers, Jr., The Persistence of Fault in Products Liability, 61 Tex. L. Rev. 777, 798
(1983).
127 See Owen at 745.
121 See Priest at 2318.
129 See Restatement § 402A, cmt. g.
31 Id, cmt h.
131 Id.
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difference between manufacturing defects and other defects, such as design
defects and inadequate warnings. In the case of manufacturing defects, the
Restatement's consumer expectation test was largely displaced (except in the
case of contaminated food and drink) by a strict liability (deviation from the
norm) approach. But if manufacturing defects are different from other defects
and if manufacturing defects are subject to strict liability, then one may argue
that design defects and inadequate warnings should not be subject o the same
liability rule as manufacturing defects. This, indeed, is a position that a
number of commentators have taken over the years."' The obvious choice
of an alternative liability rule is, of course, negligence.
At the time of § 402A's adoption, most product liability litigation
involved either contaminated food or manufacturing defects. These were one-
of-a-kind cases. In contrast, design defects cases involved an entire product
line and so the potential liability was much greater.133 However, as design
defect cases became more common in the late 1960s and early 1970s, it
became obvious that the Restatement's consumer expectation test was not
suited for this more complex type of litigation.
134
There were a number of problems with the consumer expectation test
as applied to product design.'35 First, it was difficult to determine what an
individual consumer's expectations about a product's design actually were or
should be. Most courts agreed that the consumer expectation test should be
an objective one. If the test were held to be subjective in nature, the absurd
result would be that a particular product design could be defective for some
consumers, but not for others, depending on what their individual
expectations were. Consequently, courts quickly added qualifying language,
such as "reasonable" or "ordinary" to make it clear that the expectations in
question were those of the community in general and not those of any
particular consumer.
The consumer expectation test was especially problematic when used
to evaluate a complex product's design because a consumer could not
realistically have an expectation about the design of products such as
airplanes, automobiles, or industrial machinery.136 Finally, because the
consumer expectation test was concerned with protecting consumers against
risks that could not be discovered by casual inspection, applying it to products
132 See Henderson at 403-04; See also Priest at 2303.
133 See Charles E. Cantu, Reflections on Section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts: A Mirror
Crack'd, 25 GONZ. L. REv. 205, 218-20 (1989).
131 See Richard L. Cupp, Jr. & Danielle Polage, The Rhetoric of Strict Products Liability Versus
Negligence: an EmpiricalAnalysis, 77 N.Y.U. L. REv. 874, 891 (2002).
135 See Mary J. Davis, Design Defect Liability: In Search of a Standard of Responsibility, 39 WAYNE
L. REv. 1217, 1236 (1993).
136 See Sheila L. Birnbaum, Unmasking the Testfor Design Defect: From Negligence [to Warranty] to
Strict Liability to Negligence, 33 VAND. L. REv. 593, 614 (1980); Richard L. Cupp, Jr. & Danielle Polage,
The Rhetoric of Strict Products Liability Versus Negligence: An Empirical Analysis, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV.
874, 891 (2002).
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with obvious risks meant that a manufacturer might escape liability even
though these risks could be eliminated by a safer design.
137
In response to these concerns, a new approach, known as the risk-
utility test, began to emerge in the 1970s as a test for defective design. An
early version of this test, first proposed by John Wade,138 consisted of a grab
bag of miscellaneous factors that judges and juries could pick and choose
from when deciding whether a product's design was defective or not.39
Among the factors for consideration were: the overall utility of the product;
the likelihood that the product will cause harm and the seriousness of that
harm; the availability of a substitute product; the manufacturer's ability to
eliminate the risk; the user's ability to avoid the danger by exercising due
care; the obviousness of the danger and the existence of suitable warnings and
instructions; and the manufacturer's ability to spread the loss by means of
higher prices or liability insurance.
140
Later, Page Keeton refined the Wade formula by imputing knowledge of the
design risk to the manufacturer.44 As such, it became known as the Wade-
Keeton test and was adopted by a number of courts in the 1970s. The
principal characteristic of these early versions of the risk-utility formulation
was that it asked the judge or jury to determine whether the benefits of the
product as a whole outweighed its risks and did not expressly consider the
possibility of a safer alternative design.42
Another version of this approach was known as the prudent
manufacturer test, under which the judge or jury would consider whether a
prudent manufacturer, knowing of the design's risks, would place the product
in the market.
143
Eventually, legal scholars developed a more sophisticated version of
the risk-utility test, which was primarily concerned with achieving an optimal
(or economically efficient) allocation of resources for product safety.'"
137 See David A. Fischer, Products Liability-The Meaning of Defect, 39 Mo. L. REv. 339, 348-52
(1974); Jerry J. Phillips, Products Liability: Obviousness of Danger Revisited, 15 IND. L. REV. 797, 803-
04 (1982).
138 See John W. Wade, On the Nature of Strict Tort Liability for Products, 44 MIss. L.J. 825, 837-38
(1973).
131 See W. Kip Viscusi, Wading Through the Muddle of Risk-Utility Analysis, 39 AM. U. L. REv. 573,
580-81 (1990).
140 Id.
1' See W. Page Keeton, Products Liability-Inadequacy of Information, 48 TEx. L. REv. 398, 404
(1970); Page Keeton, Manufacturers'Liability: The Meaning of "Defect" in the Manufacture and Design
of Products, 20 SYRACUSE L. REv. 559, 568 (1969).
142 See Michael D. Green, Symposium, The Products Liability Restatement: Was It a Success?: The
Unappreciated Congruity of the Second and Third Torts Restatements on Design Defects, 74 BROOK. L.
REv. 807, 822 (2009).
"' See James A. Henderson, Jr., Symposium, The Passage of Time: The Implications for Product
Liability: Product Liability and the Passage of Time: The Imprisonment of Corporate Rationality, 58 NYU
L. REv. 765, 767-68 (1983).
'" See W. Kip Viscusi et al., Determining Inefficient Pharmaceutical Litigation: An Economic
Rationale for the FDA Regulatory Compliance Defense, 24 Seton Hall L. Rev. 1437, 1448-49 (1994).
2018]
SAILING UNDER FALSE COLORS
According to this theory, producers should be encouraged to spend money on
product safety as long as these marginal safety costs are less than the marginal
costs of injuries from defective products (as measured by tort liability).
145
Conversely, a producer will choose to pay damage claims when the marginal
cost of further safety measures exceeds the marginal benefits of additional
accident cost reduction.46
The goal of optimizing resources led courts to focus on the particular aspect
of the design, usually a safety feature (or lack thereof) that caused the harm.
147
This version of the risk-utility test bore a strong resemblance to the Learned
Hand's formula in United States v. Carroll Towing Co.,148 where Judge Hand
recast negligence law's familiar reasonable prudent person standard into a
mathematical formula. According to this formula, the burden of taking
precautions to avoid a risk of harm should be balanced against the likelihood
that the harm will occur multiplied by the seriousness of the harm.149  A
finding of negligence would be justified if the burden of taking precautions is
less than the likelihood of harm multiplied by the gravity of the harm.
150
When applied to products liability, failure to adopt a more cost-efficient
design could lead a jury to conclude that the product was defective.
Some commentators objected to this version of the risk-utility
approach because they felt that it effectively resolved design defect cases
using a negligence standard. Realizing this, advocates of strict liability offered
two reasons why the risk-utility test still embodied strict liability principles.
First, they claimed that risk-utility test is not a form of negligence because the
focus is on the condition of the product rather than the conduct of the seller.'5
Second, they rejected the state of the art concept and argued that a product's
design should be judged by the technology that was available at the time of
the injury, or even at the time of trial, rather than at the time it was designed
and manufactured.
'45 See James A. Henderson, Jr., Symposium, The Passage of Time: The Implications for Product
Liability: Product Liability and the Passage of Time: The Imprisonment of Corporate Rationality, 58 NYU
L. REv. 765, 767-68 (1983).
146 See David Rosenberg, The Causal Connection in Mass Exposure Cases: A "Public Law " Vision of
the Tort System, 97 HARv. L. REv. 849, 864-65 (1984).
141 See David G. Owen, W. Page Keeton, Symposium on Tort Law, Toward a Proper Test for Design
Defectiveness: "Micro-Balacing" Costs and Benefits, 75 TEx. L. REV. 1661, 1690 (1997).
49 See United States v. Carroll Towing, Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947).
149 Id.
150 Id.
15 See, e.g., Caterpillar Tratcor Co. v. Beck 593 P.2d 871, 889 (Alaska 1979); Barker v. Lull. Eng'g
Co., 573 P.2d 443,457 (Cal. 1978); Blue v. Envtl. Eng'g, Inc., 828 N.E.2d 1128, 1142 (111. 2005); Gregory
v. Cincinnati Inc., 538 N.W.2d 325, 329 n. 8 (Mich. 1995); Prentis v. Yale Mfg. Co., 365 N.W.2d 176, 186
(Mich. 1984); Phillips v. Kimwood Machine Co., 525 P.2d 1033, 1036 (Or. 1974). See also Mary J. Davis,
Design Defect Liability: In Search of a Standard of Responsibility, 39 WAYNE L. REv. 1217, 1221 (1993)
(criticizing this practice).
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C. Inadequate Warnings.
A similar disagreement arose in connection with product warnings
and instructions. Unlike the adequacy of a product's design, courts typically
held that warnings were adequate if they satisfied certain specific
requirements.'52 First, the warning had to provide information about all
significant risks and also had to disclose the likelihood and seriousness of
these risks.'53 The warning was also required to be prominent and be phrased
with a degree of intensity that was commensurate with the danger.'54
Furthermore, the warning had to be easily understood by its intended
audience.' Finally, it must be communicated in an effective manner.
56
All of these requirements could be taken into account as factors in a
risk-utility analysis.' The dispute about whether strict liability or negligence
should be applied in failure to warn cases eventually devolved into a debate
over imputed knowledge. In other words, should the duty to warn be based on
hindsight or foresight? Advocates of a hindsight test contended that to avoid
liability, at the time of sale, a seller must disclose all risks, regardless of
whether they were scientifically knowable at that time. In the celebrated case
of Beshada v. Johns-Manville Products Corp.,58 the New Jersey court
adopted a hindsight test.159 Other courts followed the New Jersey court's
lead.'6
However, the Beshada opinion was criticized by many
commentators,161 and the New Jersey court eventually repudiated the
hindsight test in Feldman v. Lederde Laboratories162 and instead adopted a
foresight test.63 Under this approach, a seller is only required to warn of risks
that were known, or scientifically knowable, at the time of sale. A number of
other states quickly adopted the hindsight approach, and it is almost certainly
'5 See Pavlides v. Galveston Yacht Basin, Inc., 727 F.2d 330, 338 (5th Cir. 1984).
Deines v. Vermeer Mfg. Co., 755 F. Supp. 350, 353 (D. Kan. 1990).
154 Salmon v. Parke Davis & Co., 520 F.2d 1359, 1363 (4th Cir. 1975).
155 Bryant v. Technical Research Co., 654 F.2d 1337, 1345-46 (9th Cir. 1981); MacDonald v. Ortho
Pharm. Corp., 475 N.E.2d 65, 71 (Mass. 1985).
156 Sterling Drug, Inc. v. Yarrow, 408 F.2d 978, 991-92 (8th Cir. 1969).
15 Charles E. Cantu, Reflections on Section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts: A Mirror
Crack'd, 25 GONZAGA L. REv. 205, 224 (1989-90).
15 Beshada v. Johns-Manville Prods. Corp., 447 A.2d 539 (N.J. 1982).
59 1d. at 545.
'" Kisor v. Johns-Manville Corp., 783 F.2d 1337, 1341-42 (9th Cir. 1986); Johnson v. Raybestos-
Manhattan, Inc., 740 P.2d 548, 550 (Haw. 1987) (certifying questions sub nom); In re Asbestos Cases, 829
F.2d 907 (9th Cir. 1987).
161 See, e.g., James A. Henderson, Jr. & Aaron D. Twerski, Doctrinal Collapse in Products Liability:
The Empty Shell of Failure to Warn, 65 NYU L. Rev. 265, (1990); Victor Schwartz, The Post-Sale Duty
to Warn: Two Unfortunate Forks in the road to a Reasonable Doctrine, 58 NYU L. Rev. 892, 901-05
(1983); John W. Wade, On the Effect in Product Liability of Knowledge Unavailable Prior to Marketing,
58 NYU L. Rev. 734, 754-56 (1983).
162 Feldman v. Lederle Labs., 479 A.2d 374 (N.J. 1984).
163 Id. at 386-89.
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the majority rule today."6  Once the foresight approach became generally
accepted, it became apparent that the duty to warn, even more so than the law
of defective design, reflected a liability regime that was functionally
equivalent to negligence.
65
IV. THE ALl PRODUCTS LIABILITY RESTATEMENT.
In 1998, the American Law Institute replaced § 402A with a more
comprehensive document: the Products Liability Restatement.'66 Like its
predecessor, defectiveness is a fundamental aspect of the Products Liability
Restatement's liability scheme, and it holds manufacturers and sellers strictly
liable to consumers if their products are defective.'67  However, unlike §
402A, the new Restatement recognizes three distinct ways that a product may
be defective: defective manufacture, defective design, and inadequate
warnings or instructions.168 Furthermore, each type of defect is defined
differently.
Section 2(a) provides that that a product that contains a
manufacturing defect is subject to liability "even though all possible care was
exercised in the preparation and marketing of the product."'169 This is a true
strict liability rule.7° However, § 2(b), which deals with product design, and
§ 2(c), which is concerned with warnings, reflect negligence rather than strict
liability principles. For example, § 2(b) declares that a product is defective
in design "when the foreseeable risks of harm posed by the product could
have been reduced or avoided by the adoption of a reasonable alternative
design by the seller or other distributor, a predecessor in the commercial chain
of distribution and the omission of the alternative design renders the product
not reasonably safe" (emphasis added).71 Arguably, use of terms like
"foreseeable," "reasonable," and "not reasonably safe" indicate that the
liability involved in design defect cases is somewhat less than strict. This
conclusion is strengthened by the requirement that the plaintiff prove the
existence of a reasonable alternative design (RAD) in order to recover under
a defective design theory. Realizing this, some proponents of traditional strict
liability strongly objected to the inclusion of the RAD requirement, equating
"A See, e.g., Lohrnann v. Pittsburgh Coming Corp., 782 F.2d 1156, 1164-65 (4th Cir. 1986); Powers
v. Taser Int'l, Inc., 174 P.3d 777, 783-84 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2008); Owens-Illinois, Inc. v. Zenobia, 601 A.2d
633, 641 (Md. 1992); Vassallo v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 696 N.E.2d 909, 922-24 (Mass. 1998); Young
v. Key Pham., Inc., 922 P.2d 59, 63-65 (Wash. 1996).
165 Gary T. Schwartz, The Beginning and the Possible End of the Rise of Modern American Tort Law,
26 GA. L. REV. 601, 626 (1992).
" See Products Liability Restatement § 1 (1998).
167 id., § 1.
168 Id., § 2.
169 Id., 2(a).
70 See David G. Owen, Defectiveness Restated: Exploding the "Strict" Products Liability Myth, 1996
U. ILL. L. REv. 743, 751.
' See Products Liability Restatement § 2 (1998) (emphasis added).
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it with negligence law's state-of-the-art concept.'72
Section 2(c) parallels the Restatement's formula for design defects
and provides that a product may be defective because of inadequate
instructions or warning when: the foreseeable risks of harm posed by the
product could have been reduced or avoided by the provision of reasonable
instructions or warnings by the seller or other distributor, or a predecessor in
the commercial chain of distribution, and the omission of the instructions or
warnings renders the product not reasonably safe.'73 As in the case of § 2(b),
the inclusion of such terms as "reasonable" and "foreseeable" suggests that §
2(c) also reflects a negligence law influence.174
The comments and reporters' notes flesh out much of the black letter
text of § 2. For example, comment a acknowledges that the liability rule that
governs manufacturing defects is different than the rules that are applicable
to other types of defects.175 Comments d, e, andf are concerned with design
defects. Comment d, which is entitled "general considerations," confirms that
§ 2(b) has adopted reasonableness or risk-utility balancing test as the standard
for evaluating a product's design.176  The comment also states that an
assessment of product design under § 2(b) usually involves a comparison
between an alternative design and the design that caused the plaintiff's
injury. 177  Comment d then acknowledges that a similar approach "is also
used in administering the traditional standard in negligence" and then goes on
to declare that "[t]he policy reasons that support use of a reasonable- person
perspective in connection with the general negligence standard also support
its use in the products liability context."178  This comes very close to
concluding that design defect claims should be subject to a negligence
standard.
However, comment f which is entitled "factors relevant in
determining whether the omission of a [RAD] renders a product not
reasonably safe," introduces some additional considerations into design
defect litigation.179 Having established the existence of an alternative design,
comment f seemingly requires a plaintiff to provide evidence that the
alternative design is "reasonable" and that the omission of this alternative
172 See, e.g., Marshall Shapo, In search of the Law of Products Liability: The ALl Restatement Project,
48 VAND. L. REv. 631 (1995); Frank Vandall, The Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability Section
2(b): The Reasonable Alternative Design Requirement, 61 TENN. L. REv. 1407 (1994).
1' David G. Owen, Defectiveness Restated: Exploding the "Strict" Products Liability Myth, 1996 U.
ILL. L. REv. 743, 780.
174 Id. at 763-64.
1' Restatement (Second) of Products Liability § 2, cnt. a (2017).
176 Id., cmt. d.
" Id. Comment e suggests that a showing of an alternative design may not be necessary in those rare
cases where a product's design is "manifestly unreasonable."
178 Id.
179 Id., cmt. f.
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design rendered the product "not reasonably safe."18  This involves a
consideration of various "factors," including: (1) the magnitude and
probability of the foreseeable risks of harm; (2) the instructions and warnings
accompanying the product; (3) the nature and strength of consumer
expectations regarding the product, including expectations arising from
product portrayal and marketing; (4) the likely effects of the alternative design
on production costs; (5) the effects of the alternative design on product
longevity, maintenance, repair, and esthetics; and (6) the range of consumer
choice among products.18' While many of these factors are consistent with a
risk-utility analysis, some of them, such as "esthetics," consumer
expectations,182 and consumer choice seem to incorporate non-economic
considerations into the analysis. Nevertheless, commentfs overall approach
is more consistent with negligence than it is with strict liability.
Comments ij, k, 1, and m are concerned with warnings. Comment i
points out that § 2(c) adopts a reasonableness test for evaluating warnings and
that this approach parallels the standard applicable to design defects in §
2(b). 83 At the same time, while the liability standards adopted in § 2(b) and
§ 2(c) are virtually identical, the defectiveness concept is more difficult to
apply in warning cases because so many factors may be taken into account."8
Nevertheless, it is clear that § 2(c), with its emphasis on foreseeable risks,
rejects a hindsight approach and adopts a foreseeability test.85  In other
words, the liability standard is one of negligence."6
Some of the other comments either restrict the scope of strict liability
or eliminate it altogether for certain types of products or product sellers. For
example, comment j indicates that manufacturers and other sellers are,
generally not required to warn or instruct about known or obvious risks.'8 7
Also, comment k provides that manufacturers are not required to warn about
the risk of an allergic reaction unless the harm-causing ingredient "is one to
which a substantial number of persons are allergic."'
88
Finally, comment m states § 2(c) imposes liability "only when the
product is put to uses that it is reasonable to expect a seller or distributor to
18 Id.
181 Id.
'8 The role of the consumer expectation test the Product Liability Restatement is also discussed further
in comments g and h.
183 Id, cmt. i.
184 id.
'85 See Kenneth W. Simons, The Hand Formula in the Draft Restatement (Third) of Torts:
Encompassing Fairness as Well as Efficiency Values, 54 VAND. L. REv. 901,905 (2001) (pointing out that
the Restatement draft treats foresight as an aspect of the negligence analysis).
'8 See David G. Owen, The Evolution of Products Liability Law, 26 REv. OF LITIG. 955, 981 (2007).
'8 Restatement (Second) of Products Liability § 2, cmt. j (2017). However, as comment I points out,
a manufacturer may be required to design its product in such a way as to eliminate an obvious risk. Id. at
cmt. 1.
" Id., cmt k.
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foresee."'189  Thus, the Product Liability Restatement expressly adopts a
negligence-oriented foresight test and rejects the hindsight approach that
would be associated with strict liability.
Other provisions of the Products Liability Restatement also
incorporate elements of negligence. For example, § 6 avoids imposing strict
liability in most cases on the makers of prescription drugs and medical
devices.19 ° After providing for liability for prescription drugs and medical
devices that are defective in some way,1 9 1 §6(c) declares that a drug or medical
device will not be deemed not reasonably safe due to defective design "if the
foreseeable risks of harm . . . are sufficiently great in relationship to its
foreseeable therapeutic benefits that reasonable health-care providers,
knowing of such foreseeable risks and therapeutic benefits, would not
prescribe the drug or medical device for any class of patients." (emphasis
added).192
Negligence concepts are also present in the provisions of § 6 that
address the duty to warn. For example, § 6(d) states that a prescription drug
or medical device will not be treated as not reasonably safe unless reasonable
instructions or warnings regarding foreseeable risks of harm are not provided
to prescribing health care providers.193 Furthermore, § 6(d)(1) retains the
learned intermediary rule, which relieves drug manufacturers of their duty to
communicate warnings to the ultimate users or consumers of their products.194
Finally, § 6(e) states that retail sellers and distributors will not be held liable
unless the product contains a manufacturing defect or if they fail "to exercise
reasonable care." (emphasis added)19 5
This is clearly a negligence standard. I believe that negligence
concepts also pervade § 8, which is concerned with used products.96 First of
all, a seller of used products is generally liable for harm caused by a defective
product if the defect "arises from the seller's failure to exercise reasonable
care.197 Strict liability is imposed only if a manufacturing defect is involved,
if the product is remanufactured, or if the seller has failed to comply with an
applicable product safety statute.98 Certain provisions of the Products
Liability Restatement exclude other products from the scope of strict liability
and presumably leave negligence (or possibly warranty law) by default as the
applicable liability rule. For example, § 19(c) states that "[h]uman blood and
9 Id., cmt m. This foreseeability limitation also applies to product design. Id.
190 Id. § 6.
'9' Id. § 6(a)-(b).
'9 Id. § 6(c) (emphasis added).
193 Id. § 6(d).
"9 See Richard C. Ausness, Will More Aggressive Marketing Practices Lead to Greater Tort Liability
for Prescrotion Drug Manufacturers?, 37 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 97, 106-110 (2002).
'95 See PRODUCTS LIABILITY RESTATEMENT § 6(e) (1998).
196 Id § 8.
'97 Id. § 8(a).
'98 Id. § 8(b)-(d).
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human tissue, even when provided commercially," shall not be subject to
strict liability.199 Furthermore, comment b to § 19 observes, and presumably
endorses, the rule that strict liability will not be imposed on the sale of living
animals unless they are diseased.°0
Negligence principles also displace strict liability with regard to
certain post-sale duties. For example, § 10 subjects sellers to liability for
failure to provide a post-sale warning "if a reasonable person in the seller's
position would provide such a warning. '21  Likewise, § 11(b) imposes
liability on a seller who is required to, by the government, recall a product, or
who voluntarily undertakes to recall a product, but only if it "fails to act as a
reasonable person in recalling the product.,202 Finally, § 13 states that a
successor corporation may be held liable for failure to warn of a risk created
by a predecessor if "a reasonable person ... would provide a warning. ,203
Finally, § 17 declares that a damage award may be reduced when "the
plaintiff's conduct fails to conform to generally applicable rules establishing
appropriate standards of care."2°  This ambiguous statement is clarified in
comments a and b, which acknowledge that most states have adopted some
form of comparative fault and applied it to products liability cases.20 5 Thus,
the Products Liability Restatement incorporates negligence principles into
products liability law, at least where plaintiffs' conduct is concerned.
V. DISAGGREGATING PRODUCTS LIABILITY LAW.
Although it is nominally based on strict liability, modern products
liability law actually contains large pockets of negligence. To be sure,
manufacturing defects are entirely subject to a strict liability standard. If
someone is injured as the result of a manufacturing defect, he or she will
almost certainly be fully compensated. However, design defects and
inadequate warnings and instructions are different.
They are subject to a cost-benefit balancing test which insulates the
manufacturer from liability when the marginal cost of taking additional
precautions exceeds the marginal benefits of additional accident reduction.
This, of course, is essentially a negligence analysis. The negligence-based
aspects of the treatment of design and inadequate warnings are further
exemplified by the use of the state-of-the-art principle and the RAD
requirement in design defect cases as well as the use of the foresight test in
I9 ld. § 19(c).
I ld. § 19 cmt. b.
201 id. § 10(a).
202 Id. § 11(b).
203 Id. § 13(a)(2).
204 Id. § 17(a).
205 Id. § 17, comments a & b. This trend began in 1978 with the California Supreme Court's decision
in Daly v. General Motors Corp., 575 P.2d 1162, 1169 (Cal. 1978).
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warning cases. Liability is further limited under the present approach by such
defenses as comparative fault, misuse, and alteration.
I will now consider how key products liability doctrines should be
changed to reflect this reality. There are essentially three options: (1) adopt
an approach that applies strict liability to all types of defective products; (2)
adopt an approach that applies negligence principles to all types of defective
products; or (3) retain strict liability for manufacturing defects and apply a
more explicit negligence-based approach to product design and warnings.
However, before moving on to this task, I would like to briefly discuss the
status of defectiveness in products liability.
A. The Defect Requirement.
In a no-fault liability regime, some sort of limiting principle is needed
to prevent strict liability from becoming absolute liability. Under an absolute
liability regime, a manufacturer would be liable to someone who is injured by
its product even though the manufacturer has exercised reasonable care and
the product is not defective.20 6 To avoid this result, the drafters of § 402A
imposed liability upon product sellers whose products were in a defective
condition which made them unreasonably dangerous to users or consumers.20 7
This concept works well where manufacturing flaws are concerned. Thus, to
recover for a product-related injury, the victim must show that the product in
question not only caused the injury, but that it was defective in some way.
This requirement would exclude non-defective but inherently dangerous
products from liability. Furthermore, for manufactured products, the test was
simple: Did the product that caused the injury deviate in some way from its
intended design?
20 1
However, the defect requirement becomes redundant when liability
is based on negligence principles rather than strict liability, as is arguably the
case with product design and warnings. If liability in those cases is based on
a negligence-oriented risk-utility analysis, there is no need to consider
defectiveness. For example, if a risk-utility analysis reveals that a
manufacturer could have used an alternative, safer, cost-effective design, then
we would conclude that the manufacturer has acted unreasonably and should
be held liable. In other words, if the product's design is the result of
unreasonable decisions by the manufacturer, any consideration of whether the
product's design is defective is confusing and superfluous.
206 See John C.P.Goldberg, Article, Inexcusable Wrongs, 103 CAL. L. REv. 467, 506 (2015); Steven A.
Schwartz, Note, A Distinction Without a Difference?: Bartlett Going Forward, 84 FORDHAM L. REv. 325,
342 (2015).
207 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A(1).
208 The deviation from the norm test did not work very well with food and drink. Consequently, most
courts utilized the consumer expectation test instead. DAVID G. OWEN, PRODUCTS LIABILITY LAW, 487-
90 (2d ed. 2008).
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B. Adopting a "Pure" Strict Liability or a "Pure" Negligence Approach.
1. Strict Liability.
At the present time, products liability law purports to be based on
strict liability, but it is only so in the case of manufacturing defects."
9 Could
strict liability realistically be extended to include design defects or inadequate
warnings and, if so, what would it look like? First of all, almost no one wants
to impose absolute liability on product sellers. Not only would such a liability
regime impose staggering costs on product sellers (who would pass them on
to consumers), but it would be very difficult to administer in cases where
multiple causes were involved. Therefore, liability would have to be subject
to some sort of limitation. Since the current risk-utility balancing approach is
substantially similar to negligence, how would a design or warning be
defective under a true risk-utility rule?
Presumably, the defect requirement would have to be retained.
However, defectiveness is an empty concept where product design and
warnings are concerned. Something more is needed to formulate a workable
definition for defectiveness that is not merely negligence posing as strict
liability. One possibility is to retain the risk-utility balancing process in
product design and warning cases but eliminate the foreseeability rule that is
currently embodied in sections 2(b) and 2(c). In other words, to adopt a pure
strict liability approach, the state-of-the-art doctrine would have to be
removed from § 2(b) and a hindsight test would have to be imposed in § 2(c).
2. Negligence.
Another approach would be to abandon strict liability altogether and
apply negligence principles across-the-board. As mentioned earlier, such a
move would primarily affect manufacturing defects since design defects and
inadequate warning and instruction cases are already largely subject to
negligence principles. As will be discussed later, the negligence principles
applicable to design defects and inadequate warning and instructions would
incorporate a risk-utility balancing approach. As for manufacturing defects,
it might be possible to transform the existing deviation-from-the-norm
formula from a test for defectiveness into a rebutable presumption of
negligence. Another possibility would be to liberalize the "malfunction"
provision of § 3. This would bring all forms of product defect into line by
switching the focus from the defectiveness of the product to more of a focus
on the decisions that' resulted in the production of a product that was not
reasonably safe.
But is the game worth the candle? There is general agreement that
209 David G. Owen, Defectiveness Restated: Exploding the "Strict" Products Liability Myth, 1996 U.
Ill. L. Rev. 743, 744.
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the deviation from the norm approach works quite well in manufacturing
defect cases. Therefore, it may be better to acknowledge that a strict liability
approach is best for manufacturing defects and retain the deviation-from-the-
norm test in such cases. In other words, perhaps we should formally divide
products liability into a hybrid system in which manufacturing defects are
subject to a strict liability rule and other types of product defects are subject
to a form of negligence.
C. A Proposed Approach.
I propose that manufacturing defect cases would continue to be
governed by a strict liability (deviation-from-the-norm) rule, while design and
warnings cases would be covered by a negligence or risk-utility balancing
formula. No longer would courts and commentators persist in calling a pig
(negligence) a mule (strict liability), but instead they would honestly
recognize a pig for what it really is.21° But what form should this take?
Various approaches are possible. The simplest option would be to return to
the familiar "reasonable prudent person" standard. However, this formula
may not be appropriate for a process that typically involves collaborative
decisions by a multitude of people. A better approach might be to compare
the defendant's design or warning with that of a "reasonably prudent
manufacturer." This formula is somewhat similar to the "prudent
manufacturer" rule that some states adopted as an alternative to the consumer
expectation test.211 However, unlike this earlier version, knowledge of the
risk would not be imputed to the defendant.
According to another approach, proposed by my colleague, Mary
Davis, liability for product sellers in design cases "should be made in a
negligence-based action and should focus on the manufacturer's conduct by
raising the standard of care to the highest level possible.,212 This standard of
care would be similar to that traditionally imposed on common carriers and
public utilities.213  According to Professor Davis, imposing a heightened
standard of care would provide greater protection to consumers and would
also "comport with the public's demand for manufacturer responsibility. 214
By imposing a higher standard of care upon manufacturers, while still
remaining within the framework of negligence, this approach bridges the gap
between negligence and strict liability, while avoiding the conceptual
210 Id. at 749.
211 See Nichols v. Union Underwear Inc., Co., 602 S.W.2d 429,433 (Ky. 1980); Cepeda v. Cumberland
Eng'g Co., 386 A.2d 816, 821 (N.J. 1978); Phillips v. Kimwood MacHine Co., 525 P.2d 1033, 1036 (Or.
1974); see also Sheila L. Birnbaum, Unmasking the Test for Design Defect: From Negligence [to
Warranty] to Strict Liability to Negligence, 33 VAND. L. REv. 593, 618-19 (1980).
212 Mary J. Davis, Design Defect Liability: In Search of a Standard of Responsibility, 39 WAYNE L.
REV. 1217, 1220 (1993).
213 Id. at 1248-81.
214 Id. at 1222.
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problems associated with defectiveness.
A final alternative would expressly retain the existing risk-utility
balancing approach but reformulate it in a way that would make it more
transparent and less confusing. More than two decades ago, David Owen
proposed a number of alternatives to the draft Products Liability
Restatement's language in § 2(b) and § 2(c).215 Retaining the Restatement's
concept of defectiveness and the alternative design requirement, Professor
Owen suggested the following definition be adopted for design defects: "A
product is defective in design if a feasible alternative design was foreseeably
safer and better overall in terms of its balance of safety, utility and cost.
216
Presumably, a similar approach could be applied to warning and instruction
evaluations. Such a test might declare that: "A product is defective with
respect to a warning or instruction if an alternative warning or instruction was
foreseeably safer and better overall in terms of its balance of safety, utility
and cost.
217
However, I would take this a step further and eliminate the concept
of defect altogether from the liability tests for design and warnings. Instead,
as Mary Davis would suggest, the focus would shift from characterizing a
product as defective to evaluating the conduct of the manufacturer in
designing the product or formulating warnings or instructions.218 In design
cases, the applicable liability rule would be phrased as follows: "A seller shall
be liable to a user or consumer for failure to exercise reasonable care in the
design of its product if the design failed to incorporate a feasible design
feature that was foreseeably better in terms of its balance of safety, utility and
cost and that this failure was a proximate cause of the user or consumer's
injury." A similar formulation might be applied in warning cases as well: "A
seller shall be liable to a user or consumer for failure to exercise reasonable
care in the formulation or communication of its warnings or instructions if it
failed to incorporate language in its warnings or instructions that was
foreseeably better in terms of its balance of safety, utility and cost or if it
failed to exercise reasonable care in the communication of these warnings and
instructions to foreseeable users or consumers and that this failure to
formulate or communicate these warnings or instructions was a proximate
cause of the user or consumer's injury." These formulations would eliminate
the last vestige of strict liability in design and warning cases and would
predicate liability, at least for manufacturers, squarely on the basis of
negligence.
2' See David G. Owen, Defectiveness Restated: Exploding the "Strict" Products Liability Myth, 1996
U. ILL. L. REv. 743, 767-77.
216 Id. at 775.
217 Id.
2"8 Citing: Mary J. Davis, Design Defect Liability: In Search of a Standard of Responsibility, 39
WAYNE L. REV. 1217, 1221 (1993).
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A negligence approach might also be used to address the issue of
inherently dangerous products. As long as a seller warns about foreseeable
non-obvious risks, it should be able to sell such products as long as the risk
was not wholly unreasonable. Also, the adoption of an express negligence
standard should eliminate the need for a special provision for prescription
drugs and medical devices. Finally, it would eliminate most, though not all,
of the inconsistent and confusing doctrines associated with services and
hybrid transactions. Finally, the adoption of a negligence standard with
respect to product design and warnings would greatly reduce the "apples and
oranges" problem that is currently associated with mixing strict liability and
comparative fault.
However, introducing negligence principles expressly into products
liability law does raise one problem, namely whether distributors and retail
sellers should be held liable to injured consumers, and if so, on what basis.
As early as 1964, the California Supreme Court held that distributors and
retail sellers could be held strictly liable to consumers for injuries suffered
from defective products even though they did not design or manufacture the
products in question.21 9  Other courts soon followed suit22° and the rule of
distributor and retailer liability has now been endorsed by the Products
Liability Restatement.221 The imposition of liability on distributors and
retailers is not out of place in a strict liability regime where engaging in a
commercial marketing transaction, rather than failing to exercise reasonable
care, is the source of liability. However, if a negligence rule is applied to
downstream sellers, they will often escape liability unless they have failed to
discover an obvious flaw or otherwise failed to exercise due care. Another
problem is whether distributors and retailers should be held strictly liable for
manufacturing flaws, as are product manufacturers, but should only be held
to a negligence standard, like manufacturers, in product design and warning
cases.
A possible solution to this problem is to hold distributors and retail
sellers vicariously liable for the acts of manufacturers in some circumstances.
This approach can be found in the Model Uniform Products Liability Act 222
and in a number of state statutes which relieve non-manufacturing sellers of
liability unless the manufacturer is either not subject to the jurisdiction of the
court or is, or likely to become, insolvent.223  Restricting the liability of
distributors and retail sellers in this fashion protect consumers when necessary
but would also avoid the circularity problem that Prosser warned about in the
219 See Vandermark v. Ford Motor Co., 391 P.2d 168, 172 (Cal. 1964).
220 See DAVID G. OWEN, PRODUCTS LIABILITY LAW 1009 (2d ed. 2008).
221 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABLLITY § 20(a) (Am. Law. Inst. 1998).
222 Modem Uniform Products Liability Act, 44 Fed. Reg. 62725 (Oct. 13, 1979).
223 See John G. Culhane, Real and Imagined Effects of Statutes Restricting the Liability of
Nonmanufacturing Sellers of Defective Products, 95 DICK. L. REv. 287, 295 (1991).
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1960s.224
VI. CONCLUSION.
For more than half a century, many courts and commentators have
insisted that the law of products liability is based on strict liability in tort.
This principle was also embodied in the two Restatements. In fact, it is an
"open secret" that negligence principles, not strict liability, largely govern in
design and warning cases.2
5  This practice of "calling a pig a mule
' 226
continues to confuse judges, law teachers, and law students alike. The time
has come to clear this matter up once and for all. I have proposed that strict
liability, in the form of the "deviation-from-the-norm" test, be retained in
manufacturing defect cases, while cases involving product design and
warnings should be governed by negligence principles that reflect some form
of risk-utility balancing. Furthermore, if this approach is adopted, the concept
of defectiveness, and the definitional problems that are associated with it, can
be dispensed with. If this proposal is adopted, I believe that products liability
litigation will become clearer, more fair and more transparent.
224 See Prosser, supra note 1, at 1133-34.
22 See David G. Owen, Defectiveness Restated: Exploding the "Strict" Products Liability Myth, 1996
U. ILL. L. REv. 743, 749.
226 Id.
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